











by	 explaining	 why	 the	 private	 health	 insurance	 markets	 exist.	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 the	
methods	employed	to	secure	innovative	data	from	the	private	health	insurance	sector.	The	
results	 of	 the	 research	 conducted	 in	 collaboration	 with	 the	 International	 Federation	 of	
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be	 $10.1	 trillion	 by	 2022	 (Deloitte,	 2018).	 Each	 year,	 7.3%	of	 that	 total	 (Gee,	 Button	 and	
Brooks,	2011),	or	an	estimated	$470	billion	in	2012	and	$740	in	2022,	is	lost	to	healthcare	
fraud	 and	 error.	 According	 to	 the	 2016	 report	 of	 the	 Association	 of	 Certified	 Fraud	
Examiners	 the	 health	 sector	 is	 fifth	 on	 the	 list	 of	 sectors	mostly	 affected	 by	 fraud	 (ACFE,	
2016).		
In	2004	the	European	Healthcare	Fraud	and	Corruption	Network	(EHFCN)	declaration	called	









we	 first	 define	what	 is	 understood	 as	 the	 PHI,	which	 is	 not	 a	 simplistic	 division	 between	
public	and	private	insurance.	Then	we	will	present	the	results	of	a	ground-breaking	survey	
conducted	 in	 collaboration	 with	 the	 International	 Federation	 of	 Health	 Plans	 [iFHP].	 The	
analysis	 reveals	 a	number	of	 topical,	 interesting	 and	useful	 insights.	 Lastly,	we	 consider	 a	
way	 forward	 together	 with	 some	 concluding	 thoughts	 about	 how	 the	 private	 health	
insurance	sector	could	develop	in	terms	of	fraud	resilience.		
The	 findings	 in	 this	paper	 reflect	 the	 contemporary	preventive	approach	 to	 tackling	 fraud	
across	 a	 global	 spread	of	 PHI	 providers	 and	 consider	 the	 areas	of	 contention,	 disparity	 in	
approach	and	potential	concerns	common	to	all,	noting	that	more	must	be	done	to	address	
the	 issue.	 Particularly	 there	 are	 indications	 of	 large	 variations	 in	 counter-fraud	measures	
which	suggest	a	potent	and	immediate	need	for	well-established	benchmarks.	As	has	been	





capable	of	a	simple	definition.	Every	country	 in	 the	European	Union	allows	PHI	 to	be	sold	
alongside	 statutory	 health	 insurance,	 yet	 there	 is	 a	 substantial	 difference	 in	 the	 role	 PHI	
																																																						
2	Figures	used	on	this	factsheet	are	based	on	2010	data.	Note	that	increases	in	US$	expenditure	levels	partially	






2009).	Moving	beyond	 the	EU	PHI	plays	 a	 role	 in	healthcare	Australia	 and	Canada,	Brazil,	
Chile,	 South	 Africa	 and	 the	USA	 (EHFCN,	 2019).	 The	 coverage,	 however,	 is	 diverse	 rather	
than	a	monolith	‘one	size	fits	all’	approach.	This	diversity	makes	it	difficult	to	define	what	is	









paper,	 it	 is	 critical	 to	 consider	 broad	 theoretical	 explanations	 in	 favour	 of	 PHI	 so	we	 can	
understand	why	nations	have	a	form	of	PHI.	In	this	paper	we	take	PHI	to	be	health	insurance	
that	is	provided	independently	of	a	National	Health	Service.		
Those	 in	 favour	 of	 PHI	 often	 highlight	 the	 inequity	 and	 inefficiency	 inherent	 in	 a	 state	
bureaucracy,	 the	 absence	 of	 appropriate	 ‘financial’	 incentives	 and	 state	 failure	 to	 raise	
sufficient	 revenue	 to	 fund	 the	 costs	 of	 public	 health	 care	 (see	 e.g.	 Colombo	 and	 Tapay,	
2004).	PHI	 can	potentially	address	 these	 limitations	 in	 three	ways.	 First,	 the	profit	motive	
and	 competition	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 lead	 to	 efficient	 administration	 (in	 this	 sense	 low	
costs	and	speed	of	treatment),	plus	 innovation,	and	advanced	quality	of	care.	Second,	PHI	
mobilises	additional	resources	for	health	care,	which	reduces	pressure	on	public	healthcare	
funds.	 Third,	 PHI	 can	 establish	 pre-payment	 for	 services,	 and	 also	 pool	 financial	 risks	
(Thomson,	Foubister,	and	Mossialos,	2009)	to	protected	PHI	businesses.	This	 is	one	of	the	
major	differences	between	public	and	private	insurance;	public	insurance	is	via	taxation	or	
social	 security	 payments	 whilst	 private	 healthcare	 is	 via	 direct	 payment	 to	 an	 insurance	
company.	 The	 boundary	 between	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sector,	 however,	 has	 become	
increasingly	blurred	with	enrolment	of	people	on	either	or	a	combination	of	mandatory	and	
voluntary	schemes,	guaranteeing	care	via	contributions	that	are	based	on	risk,	coverage	of	a	
community	 of	 people	 (transfer	 between	 healthy	 and	 sick)	 or	 income	 (transfer	 between	
income	 brackets),	 which	 is	 based	 on	 the	 organisational	 structure	 of	 provision	 such	 as	
commercial	for	profit	or	non-profit	sectors	(Sekhri,	Savedoff	and	Thripathi,	2005).										
However,	seen	as	a	process,	PHI	will	only	result	in	an	optimally	efficient	allocation	of	health	
care	 resources	 if	 certain	 assumptions	 hold.	 Markets	 for	 health	 insurance	 -	 or	 more	
accurately,	markets	in	which	health	insurance	is	voluntary	-	are	characterised	by	a	number	
of	 failures	 such	as	 complex	policy	documentation,	misleading	 information,	 and/or	 corrupt	
abuse	 of	 the	 PHI	market	 (Savedoff	 and	 Hussmann,	 2006.	 Holmberg	 and	 Rothstein,	 2010,	
Busch,	2012,	Jain,	Nundydean	and	Abbas,	2014).	In	the	latter	case	a	company	will	eventually	










are	 unable	 to	 secure	 private	 healthcare	 coverage,	 or	 coverage	 at	 a	 price	 that	 individuals	
and/or	a	family	can	afford.	Furthermore,	an	insurance	company	will	maintain	profit	margins	
by	 selecting	 risks	 rather	 than	 through	 efficiency	 savings	 and	 purchasing	 services	 and	










rigidly	 define	 PHI.	 Referring	 back	 to	 the	 definition	 used	 here	 it	 is	 not	 always	 clear	 what	
“independent	 to	national	health	service”	 translates	 to	 in	 reality.	For	example,	 in	2006	 the	
Netherlands	 introduced	 a	 universal	 health	 insurance	 scheme	 that	 is	 statutory	 (it	 is	
compulsory	for	all	residents	and	regulated	by	the	state)	and	private	(since	it	is	managed	by	






presented	 here	 are	 based	 on	 the	 iFHP	 2018	 FAWE	 Resilience	 Report	 developed	 in	








In	 order	 to	 understand	 fraud	 resilience,	 one	must	 first	 as	 accurately	 as	 possible	measure	
fraud.	As	repeatedly	highlighted	by	Gee	and	Button	(2013,	2014,	2015,	2017,	2018)	this	 is	
possible	 yet	 not	 always	 done	 (Brooks,	 2016;	 Levi	 and	 Burrows,	 2008;	 Stiernstedt,	 2016;	
Tombs	 2009;	 Urra,	 2007).	 Partly	 due	 to	 the	 inherent	 difficulties	 of	 creating	 a	 universally	











Error	 An	 unintended	 human	 and/or	 systemic	 innocent	 misrepresentation	 with	 no	
malicious	intent	
It	 should	 be	 noted	 however,	 that	 these	 definitions	 were	 developed	 specifically	 for	 this	
project,	and	that	there	were	(and	to	some	extent	still	possibly	are)	different	interpretations	
of	 the	various	concepts	also	between	 the	participating	organisations.	The	 reasons	 for	 this	
include	organisations	operating	within	different	 regulatory	 frameworks	and	applying	 tools	
and	technology	that	also	have	a	normative	 influence	on	definitions.	Nevertheless,	none	of	
the	 definitions	were	 competing	 and	 since	 the	 definitions	 above	were	 intentionally	 broad	
there	was	general	consensus	in	the	interpretations	by	participants.	The	feedback	from	the	
survey,	 however,	 did	 show	 a	 desire	 for	 further	 elaboration	 and	 subsequent	 sector-wide	
acceptance	of	common	definitions	of	these	key	concepts.		
From	 establishing	 definitions,	 the	 next	 step	 would	 be	 to	 devise	 and	 implement	 various	
measures	 to	 counter	 the	 identified	 vulnerabilities.	 This	 too	 is	 being	 done,	 but	 often	
somewhat	 arbitrarily	 and	 not	 always	 by	 means	 which	 are	 research	 and	 evidence	 based	
(Stowell,	Schmidth	and	Wadlinger,	2018).	This	is	also	clear	from	the	survey	results	showing	a	
multitude	 of	 approaches	 taken	 by	 PHI	 providers,	 and	 while	 all	 arguably	 have	 a	 vested	
interest	 to	 counter	 and	 reduce	 fraud	 there	 is	 need	 for	 both	 a	 wider	 and	 deeper	
understanding	of	how	fraud	is	addressed.	It	 is	therefore	in	the	interests	of	an	organization	
like	 the	 iFHP	 to	 address	 this	 problem	on	 a	 large	 scale	 that	 results	 in	 real-world	 data	 and	
applications	that	could	benefit	and	advance	the	fight	against	fraud	in	the	sector.		
To	 that	end	a	survey	was	distributed	 in	 late	2018	to	 five	 (5)	member	organisations	of	 the	
iFHP.	The	survey	collected	data	under	the	four	categories;	organisation,	people,	investment	
and	technology.	The	discussion	in	this	article	draws	upon	data	from	all	four	categories	with	
an	emphasis	on	 creating	 an	understandable	picture	of	 the	approach	 to	payment	 integrity	
activities,	 the	process	 governing	 the	 FAWE-related	 issues,	 the	people	within	 that	process,	
and,	to	some	extent,	the	technology	used	to	facilitate	this	process.	The	results	of	the	survey	
represent	the	data	submitted	by	each	of	the	five	organisations.	Given	the	sample	size	and	
variance	 in	 answer	 data	 density	 (i.e.	 the	 amount,	 detail	 and	 relevance	 of	 information	
provided	in	an	answer),	the	limits	of	measurement	quality	must	be	acknowledged.	In	short,	
measurement	quality	refers	to	the	strength	of	the	relationship	between	the	concepts	that	
are	 of	 interest	 and	 the	 observed	 answer.	 As	 a	 result,	 exact	 calculations	 and	 values	 on	




Where	 data	 is	 absent	 this	 is	 highlighted	 in	 the	 report	 by	 indicating	 the	 number	 of	
organisations	that	responded	and/or	fail	to	respond.	It	is	worth	noting	that	not	all	questions	
were	categorically	answered	nor	were	the	answers	delivered	in	the	same	format.	This	goes	
beyond	 the	 factual	 content	 and	 numerical	 values	 of	 a	 question	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	
respondents	interpreting	and	thus	answering	in	qualitatively	different	ways.	To	a	degree	this	




by	 some	 more	 specifically	 related	 to	 the	 approach	 to	 PIA,	 the	 governing	 processes,	 the	
people	and	the	technological	systems.		
Research	findings	
The	 numbers	 of	 lives	 covered	 nationally	 by	 the	 five	 organisations	 surveyed	 range	 from	
about	0.8	to	almost	4	million	with	the	total	number	of	 lives	covered	about	8.7	million.	All	
five	 organisations	 conduct	 various	 Payment	 Integrity	 Activities	 [PIA].	 The	 PIA	 occurs	 both	
pre-	 and	 post-payment	 and	 is	 executed	 both	 internally	 and	 by	 third	 party	 external	
resources.	All	 organisations	 target	 hospital,	medical,	 ancillary,	members/customers	 claims	
lines.	 Four	 organisations	 target	 staff/employees	 claim	 lines	 and	 one	 organisation	 has	
outsourced	 this	 type	of	 claim.	Only	 three	organisations	 target	 third	party	 claim	 lines.	 The	
average	annual	total	paid	out	claims	recovered	for	2016-2018	for	fraud	is	1%,	abuse	17.5%,	
waste	60.5	%,	and	error	21%.	The	percentage	of	PIA	pre	and	post	payment	is:	pre-payment	
ranges	 from	15-80	%	 across	 all	 organisations	 and	 post	 payment	 20-85	%.	 It	 is	 noted	 that	
changes	 to	 these	 ratios	 are	 currently	 under	 assessment	 and	 subject	 to	 change.	 Currently	
only	 one	 organisation	 has	 a	 pre-payment	 PIA	 above	 50	 %	 but	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	
movement	towards	an	emphasis	on	pre-payment	PIA.	According	to	the	analysis	 there	are,	
however,	no	clear	criteria	or	routes	that	lead	to	investigation,	yet	another	point	that	merits	
additional	 consideration.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 organisations	 report	 a	 substantial	 return	 on	





It	 is	 from	 these	 figures	 that	we	now	 turn	our	 attention	 to	 a	more	 specific	 analysis	of	 the	
approach	to	PIA,	the	governing	processes,	the	people	and	the	technological	systems.	What	










and	 post-payment	 of	 claims.	 Literature	 on	 countering	 fraud	 for	 competitive	 advantage	
(Button	and	Gee,	2013)	would	 suggest	 that	a	preventive	approach	 is	preferred	 to	a	more	
reactive	one.	While	this	seems	to	be	the	trend	there	are	still	rather	large	variations	where	
the	organisations	 report	diametric	 ratios,	one	doing	80/20	pre/post	activities	and	another	
reporting	 20/80.	 The	 survey	 responses	 do	 indicate	 that	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 recognition	 of	




lack	 of	 clear	 and	 universally	 adopted	 definitions	 of	 fraud,	 abuse,	 waste	 and	 error.	 This,	
however,	is	not	unique	to	the	PHI	sector	and	similar	difficulties	can	be	seen	in	for	example	
the	 fight	 against	 corruption	 (Brooks,	 2016;	 Gardiner,	 2002;	 Heywood,	 2015;	 Graycar	 and	
Prenzler,	 2013).	 Analogous	 to	 empirical	 evaluations	 of	 anti-corruption	 efforts,	 that	
sometimes	at	surface	level	suffer	inexplicable	failure	(see	e.g.	Marquette	and	Peiffer,	2015;	
Persson,	Rothstein	and	Teorell,	2013),	so	could	the	FAWE-resilience	of	PHI	organisations.	An	
indication	 is	 the	 apparent	 lack	 of	 clear	 and	 transferable	 criteria	 across	 the	 different	
organisations	of	what	it	is	that	leads	to	investigating	a	claim.	This	does	not	mean	that	each	
organisation	 is	not	 reporting	any	criteria,	 they	are,	but	 there	 is	 little	 consistency	between	
them	 and	 perhaps	 more	 importantly	 the	 criteria	 are	 not	 always	 based	 on	 empirical	
evidence.	This	deduction	is	further	strengthened	when	examining	the	number	of	currently	
open	 investigations	where	 there	 is	 a	 large	variance	between	organisations	 for	no	obvious	
reasons.	 Further	 data	 collection	 and	 analysis	 may	 reveal	 a	 less	 obvious	 reason	 but	 no	
correlation	between	any	of	the	available	indicators	were	found	here.			
Also,	 when	 looking	 at	 the	 distribution	 of	 dedicated	 employees’	 contra	 the	 number	 of	
currently	 open	 investigations	 there	 are	 significant	 differences.	 Whether	 these	 pertain	 to	
variations	 in	 definitions,	 investigation	 criteria,	 or	 something	 else	 remains	 to	 be	 seen.	
Nevertheless,	 the	average	caseload	 for	each	dedicated	employee	 is	122	cases	per	 year.	A	
dedicated	employee	is	defined	as	one	that	works	primarily	with	FAWE-related	tasks.	The	key	








While	 the	 analysis	 of	 people	 revealed	 a	 number	 of	 distinct	 empirical	 deductions	 the	
opposite	 can	 be	 said	 about	 the	 technological	 systems.	 The	 developments	 in	 technologies	
that	facilitate	PIA	activities	also	produce	risks.	An	overreliance	on	technological	safeguards	
may	 lead	 to	 even	 greater	 losses	 that	 are	 both	 harder	 to	 detect	 and	 more	 complex	 to	
investigate.	 Further,	 this	 also	 ties	 into	 a	 public	 policy	 debate	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 this	
research	 where	 expanding	 regulation	 to	 also	 include	 the	 use	 of	 technology	 may	 be	 a	
possible	future	for	PHI	(Erdélyi	and	Goldsmith,	2018).	Nevertheless,	all	organisations	attest	
to	 having	 various	 software	 solutions	 both	 for	 analysis	 and	 identification	 as	 well	 as	
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investigation	 and	 case	 management.	 The	 organisations	 thus	 acknowledge	 the	 need	 for	
technology-facilitated	PIA	activities	partly	as	a	response	to	technology-driven	fraud	vectors.	
These	 solutions,	 however,	 whether	 off-the	 shelf	 or	 in-house	 developed,	 may	 not	 suffice	
against	the	risks	to	which	the	organisations	are	exposed.	This	is	especially	pertinent	if	these	
measures	 are	 deployed	 reactively	 to	 address	 a	 security	 breach	 that	 has	 already	 been	
exploited.	Some	respondents	allude	to	machine	learning	algorithms	and	AI-type	solutions	as	
being	the	answer.		
Indicated	 in	 our	 research	 the	 PHI	 sector	 deals	 with	 past,	 present	 and	 future	 events	
concurrently.	Some	of	these	risks	and	threats	are	constant	such	as	up-coding	of	treatment.	
We,	however,	see	up-coding	as	a	type	of	fraud:	to	manufacture	a	claim	is	fraud;	equally	to	
claim	 for	 incomplete	 or	 non-existent	 work	 is	 also	 a	 fraud.	 These	 up-coding	 episodes	 cut	
across	 hospitals,	 medical,	 ancillary,	 members	 and	 employees	 alone	 or	 in	 collusion.	









life	 and	 longevity.	 In	 principle,	 spending	 on	 healthcare	 should	 occur	 if	 clinical	 benefits	
outweigh	harms	and	of	course,	should	lead	to	judicious	use	of	resources	-	public	and	private	
insurance	 –	 built	 on	 established	medical	 evidence,	 expertise	 and	medical	 judgement,	 and	
the	individualised	needs	of	patients	(Ryan,	2017).	Health	risks,	however,	are	not	static;	they	
change	 as	 health	 care	 issues	 arise	 in	 the	 course	 of	 life.	 Health	 care	 services	 then	 are	 a	
constant	 need;	 from	 conception	 to	 death.	 Exposure	 to	 health	 risks	 is	 not	 always	 in	 the	






research	 we	 discovered	 that	 whilst	 these	 systems	 are	 similar	 in	 orientation,	 different	
systems	are	employed.	 Each	organisation	 surveyed	 in	 this	 research	made	 it	 clear	 it	 had	a	












systems	 have	 to	 deal	 with	 numbers	 of	 people	 and	 volume	 of	 claims	 on	 known	 medical	
treatment	 but	 also	 ‘new’	 medical	 services	 available.	 These	 ‘new’	 medical	 advances	 and	
some	 non-medical	 services	 i.e.	 cosmetic	 surgery	 often	 presented	 as	 crucial	 medical	
treatment,	 put	 pressure	 on	 the	 PHI	 sector.	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	 the	 overuse	 of	 medical	







of	 the	 armoury	 needed	 to	 reduce	 losses	 to	 fraud	 (Sparrow,	 1998,	 2000;	 Busch,	 2012)	 as	
technical	 systems	have	 limits.	A	healthcare	 system	checks	 the	 claim	and	 the	amount	 that	
should	be	dispensed	to	a	healthcare	professional,	hospital,	or	 individual	claimant.	Systems	
primarily	 correct	 claim	 errors	 and	 inappropriate	 procedure,	 and	 reject	 claims	 if	 the	
provider(s),	recipient,	or	procedure	is	somehow	ineligible.	This,	however,	is	limited	in	trying	
to	 verify	 that	 the	 healthcare	 service	 was	 provided	 as	 claimed,	 or	 that	 the	 diagnosis	 is	
legitimate,	 or	 the	patient	 is	 aware	of	 the	 supposed	 treatment.	Whilst	 healthcare	 systems	
have	 advanced	 in	 processing	 claims	 the	 ‘human	 touch’	 is	 needed	 to	 identify	 ‘suspicious’	
claims	that	possibly	contain	deception	or	misrepresentation.	
If	the	system	in	place	is	based	on	the	assumption	‘systems	select:	humans	inspect’	(Sparrow,	
1996)	 this	 limits	 the	 capacity	of	 a	 company	 to	 reduce	 its	 losses	 to	 fraud.	 Furthermore,	 as	
private	hospitals	invest	in	technology	and	the	science	of	healthcare	claim	clinical	advances,	
patients	 clamour	 for	 the	 latest	 and	 most	 expensive	 treatment.	 The	 most	 expensive,	
however,	 should	 not	 be	 translated	 into	 the	 best	 treatment.	 This	 is	 a	 matter	 for	 the	 PHI	
sector	which,	as	emphasised	in	this	research,	sometimes	has	to	manage	unrealistic	demands	
and	healthcare	for	patients.	All	PHI	contracts	have	elements	of	exclusion	in	them,	which	is	




pressure	 to	 pay	 for	 increasingly	 expensive	 treatment.	 One	 is	 to	 pay	 for	 ‘coverage	 with	
evidence	development’.	 In	this	approach,	 insurance/purchasers	could	pay	for	an	unproven	
intervention	 (or	 an	 existing	 intervention	 for	 an	 unproven	 patient	 population),	 only	 if	
patients	enrol	 in	a	randomised	controlled	trial	comparing	the	new	 intervention	to	existing	





this	 is	 no	 fail-safe	 system	 that	 would	 prevent	 fraud,	 abuse,	 waste	 and	 error,	 but	 could	
reduce	unnecessary	spending,	releasing	funds	to	be	used	on	proven	healthcare	treatment.		
We	 have	 known	 for	 some	 time	 now	 that	 healthcare	 professionals	 i.e.	 physicians	 vary	 in	
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treatment	 practice(s)	 (klik,	 Mikkers	 and	 Wijnker,	 2017).	 The	 consequent	 variation	 in	
treatment	 means	 that	 FAWE-related	 issues	 are	 hard	 to	 uncover,	 and	 thus	 measure	 and	
ultimately	 prove	 in	 the	 healthcare	 sector.	 Treatment	 for	 patients	 is	 often	 made	 under	
conditions	of	uncertainty	i.e.	an	illness/disease	is	suspected,	and	prevention	is	preferable	to	
cure,	 but	 can	 lead	 to	 waste,	 but	 not	 necessarily	 fraud.	 Here,	 the	 role	 of	 technology	 is	




a	 wide	 range	 of	 professional	 people;	 such	 as	 ex-law	 enforcement,	 nurses,	
computer/systems	and	data	analysists	as	well	as	the	expected	counter	 fraud	specialist.	All	
offer	 a	 range	 of	 knowledge	 on	 the	 healthcare	 market	 and	 complement	 the	 payment	
integrity	 systems.	 If	 a	 system	 highlights	 a	 potential	 problem,	 or	 fails	 to	 do	 so,	 such	





well	as	corruption.	Data	analysis	 is	a	useful	tool	 in	trying	to	uncover	fraud	but	can	 lead	to	
false	positives	 (data	 indicating	potential	 fraud,	 but	 investigation	 shows	none	occurred)	 or	
false	 negatives	 (where	 data	 analysis	 failed	 to	 uncover	 fraud	 because	 the	 data	was	 in-line	






become	aware	of	a	technical	test	to	detect	 it,	 it	 is	possible	to	alter	and	adjust	the	data	to	
avoid	 suspicion	 and	 detection.	 Small,	 consistent	 frauds	 and	 abuse	 that	 hardly	 stray	 from	
‘expected’	payment	 integrity	claims	 for	 treatment	and	care	can	fail	 to	register	on	systems	
that	 highlight	 unexpected	 claims	 for	 payment.	 This	 ‘dripping	 tap’	 effect	 (Gee,	 Button	 and	
Brooks,	 2011;	 Brooks,	 Button	 and	 Gee,	 2013;	 Brooks,	 Tunley,	 Button	 and	 Gee,	 2017)	
however,	 is	 the	 cause	 of	 substantial	 funds	 lost	 to	 fraud.	 In	 this	 context	 a	 potential	 ‘arms	
race’	 between	 data	 analytics	 and	 those	 out	 to	 commit	 fraud	 occurs	 (klik,	 Mikkers	 and	














While	 there	 is	a	 substantial	difference	 in	 the	 role	of	PHI	 in	different	 countries,	 the	health	
system	 itself,	 and	 the	 size	 and	 function	 of	 the	 health	 insurance	market	 –	 there	 are	 also	
similarities.	One	similarity	is	its	inherent	susceptibility	and	vulnerability	to	FAWE-issues.	This	
paper,	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 state	 of	 play,	 has	 established	 the	 general	 nature	 of	 the	 PHI	
sector	 to	 set	 the	 stage	 for	 a	 fact-finding	mission	 into	 some	 of	 the	 PHI	 provider’s	 FAWE-
resilience.	 Such	 a	 mission	 would	 be	 to	 understand	 and	 map	 the	 problem,	 in	 order	 to	
subsequently	develop	benchmarks,	best	practices	and	ultimately	reduce	loss.	Similar	to	this	
research,	 the	 underlying	 data	 could	 be	 collected	 by	 a	 survey	 and	 amplified	 by	 adding	
qualitative	interviews	with	various	stakeholders.		
The	 first	 step	 would	 then	 be	 to	 enhance	 and	 expand	 the	 survey	 itself,	 and	 then	 add	 a	
qualitative	 layer.	 First,	 include	 question	 frames,	 i.e.	 a	 body	 of	 text	 for	 each	 question	




Third,	 complement	 the	 quantitative	 nature	 of	 the	 data	 presented	 in	 this	 report	 with	
qualitative	 analysis.	 This	 is	 arguably	 the	most	 important	 enhancement	 in	 terms	of	 adding	
rich,	 informative	 and	 actionable	 data.	 From	 a	 methodological	 perspective	 this	 three-
pronged	approach	would	mean	a	significant	step	in	the	right	direction.	
There	 are	 also	 clear	 indications	 of	 the	 way	 forward	 from	 a	 more	 practical	 perspective.	
Keeping	 with	 the	 overarching	 headings,	 governing	 process,	 people	 and	 technology	 –	 a	
number	of	issues	and	their	redress	can	be	identified.	The	governing	processes	cannot	expect	
to	 contain	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	 fraud,	 abuse,	 waste	 and	 error	 without	 developing	 a	
framework	 with	 a	 holistic	 approach	 that	 takes	 not	 only	 governance,	 but	 also	 business	
processes,	 technological	 advancements	 and	 overall	 organisational	 maturity	 into	
consideration	 in	 relation	 to	 this	 risk	 management.	 Future	 research	 as	 proposed	 would	
strengthen	those	aspects	in	reverse	order.	Informing	a	holistic	yet	diverse	approach	would	
help	 organisations	 to	manage	 their	 fraud	 risks	 successfully,	 in	 accordance	with	 evidence-
based	‘true’	needs.		
The	same	principle	also	applies	to	people	–	the	need	for	a	diversified	yet	holistic	approach.	
For	 people	 that	 means	 also	 looking	 beyond	 hard	 skills	 and	 credentials	 to	 soft	 skills	 and	
attitudes.	 These	would	 be	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 the	 expressed	 and	 embodied	 principles	
and	ethics	of	the	organisation	(Dorminey	et	al.,	2010;	Rubasundram,	2015).	These	translate	
into	 both	 individual	 and	 collective	 norms	 and	 values	 that	 determine	 not	 only	 a	 code	 of	










number	 of	 sectors	 specific	 key	 functions	 that	 are	 considered	 essential	 for	 effective	
management	 and	 investigate	 to	 what	 extent	 these	 are	 fulfilled.	 For	 example,	 advanced	
predictive	 analysis	 can	 be	 utilised	 preventively	 by	 identifying	 suspicious	 patters	 and	
reactively	by	detecting	fraudulent	transactions.	Given	the	size	and	scope	of	the	PHI	sector,	
developing	 and	 implementing	 tools	 to	 manage	 big	 data	 seems	 inevitable.	 Here	 we	 see	






are	 both	 conceptually	 and	 practically	 situated	 in	 different	 areas	 but	 are	 nonetheless	
interrelated	 and	must	be	 treated	 in	 an	 integrated	manner.	 It	 is	 thus	 essential	 for	 policies	
and	procedures	to	be	established	in	such	a	way	that	they	correspond	to	the	realities	of	the	
fraud	 risks	 to	 the	 PHI	 sector,	 and	 such	 realities	 have	 to	 be	 properly	 established	 and	
evidence-based.	 Even	 though	 healthcare	 fraud	 will	 never	 be	 completely	 eradicated	 (see	
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